The art of conversation: design cybernetics and its ethics by Westermann, Claudia




The paper discusses ethical principles that are implicit in second-order cybernetics, with the aim 
of arriving at a better understanding of how second-order cybernetics frames living in a world 
with others. It further investigates implications for second-order cybernetics approaches to 
architectural design, i.e., the activity of designing frameworks for living. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper investigates the terminology in the second-order cybernetics literature with specific 
attention to terms that suggest that there are ethical principles at work. It further relates second-
order cybernetics to selected notions in phenomenology, pragmatism and transcendental idealism. 
The comparison allows for conclusions about the specificity of a second-order inquiry. In line with 
the thematic focus of this journal issue on the framing of shared worlds, the paper further elaborates 
on questions relating to the activity of designing ‘worlds’ in which people live with others. 
 
Findings 
The paper highlights that a radical openness toward the future and toward the agency of others is 
inscribed in the conception of second-order cybernetics. It creates a frame of reference for 
conceiving social systems of all kinds, including environments that are designed to be inhabited. 
 
Originality/value 
The paper identifies an aesthetics grounded in the process of living-with-others as an ethical 
principle implicit in second-order cybernetics thought. It is an aesthetics that is radically open for 
the agency of others. Linking aesthetics and ethics, the paper’s contributions will be of specific 
value for practitioners and theoreticians of design. Considering second-order cybernetics as a 



















The world in which we want to live 
Man is prone to seek novelty in his environment and, having found a novel situation, to learn 
how to control it.  (Pask, 1970, p. 76) 
 
[…] the alternative to reason, as a source for a universal system of values, is aesthetic seduction 
in favor of a frame of reference specifically designed to comply with his desires (and not his 
needs) and defining the functions to be satisfied by the world (cultural and material) in 
which he wants to live.  (Maturana, 1980a, p. 58) 
 
One can assume that most people would agree with the proposition that we, human beings, 
would like to live in a world that makes sense to us. We would like to live in a world in which 
what we do carries meaning, a world open for next generations to inhabit in a meaningful way 
as well. So, what makes life meaningful? And, what role can or should architects and designers 
play in engendering meaningful connections between human beings and the world they inhabit? 
The responses that have received substantial support and promotion in the past decade have been 
those that promised to provide us through concepts, such as the smart city, with a more efficient 
and better life. These responses are founded on the premise that technological progress, per se, 
means improvement. However, it has become apparent that technological progress by itself 
does not lead to a viable model (cp. Thrift, 2014). By positing that technological progress is a 
value per se and by setting it as an a priori, thus suggesting that the problems humanity is facing 
could be solved quasi-automatically, critical questions of what the foundations for a meaningful 
life are have been circumvented (cp. Maturana, 1997). 
 
As scientific studies indicate, people have an intuitive understanding of what makes their life 
meaningful. They understand that ‘technological progress’ is not necessarily conducive to a greater 
sense of meaning even though they may enjoy the increased comfort and efficiency that 
technological advances confer. A happy life is not necessarily a meaningful life (Grewal, 2014). The 
most obvious response to the question of what makes life meaningful is ‘love.’ Love links us to the 
world and allows us to communicate in meaningful ways. Love is sharing without expectations, and 
yet, love is a tricky subject, as the term is trivialized and ubiquitously employed in the advertising 
strategies of myriad consumer products. While 'to love,’ but not necessarily seeking to be loved or 
seeking for a large number of ’likes’ and ’followers,’ might be an obvious way for embedding 
meaning in life, a theory of love as a general theory could easily prove to be both too limiting and 
too open to create a viable framework for action. In the history of humankind, various attempts have 
been made, Christian theology being the prime example, to define love via an absolute as a basic 
ethical principle for living. It advocates the renouncement not only of war and revenge, but also of 
defense – and not only of oneself but of worldly love as well. Depending on how theory frames love, 
if it is linked to an absolute that is exterior to the world, as a framework for action, such a theory 
would necessarily require everyone to become either an idealist or believer. It is not a path everyone 
would embark on. Having existed for thousands of years, theories of higher order love have neither 
prevented war nor injustice.  This is not to say that it doesn’t make sense to speculate on an absolute 
wisdom governed by love. After all, we learn from stories, and they create opportunities for 
interpreting lived experiences in novel ways. A new world, in which human beings connect and 
engage with each other peacefully and meaningfully could be initiated via theories that rely on love 
as an external independent reality if all agreed on a specific narrative of transcendental love as a 
frame of reference, or if all agreed that any such tale is a valid tale. This, however, is not a feasible 
scenario.  
 
If a theory that incorporates love as a transcendental ideal does not make for a feasible framework, 
is there another way to frame what we do in such a way that meaningful living remains a 
possibility? The following passages outline how architectural theory has attempted to frame the 
world we live in with others with a specific focus on questions of meaning, and then proceeds to 




Worlds for discoverers and inventors 
Architectural theory has engaged for many years in a project that attempts to respond to the question 
of what designing environments that allow for meaningful living could be. It has reflected this 
matter within the context of ‘Being-in.’ Relying primarily on the phenomenology of Martin 
Heidegger or Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who explicitly dealt with questions of living in time and 
space, architectural theory saw in phenomenology the possibility for a transfer, and for a vision of 
architecture as something other than a predominantly technical discipline. In this vision, the task of 
architecture is to anchor human beings in the world poetically and thus meaningfully. A well known 
example is architectural theory's recurrent reference to Martin Heidegger's interpretation of a poem 
by Hölderlin in the essay “… Poetically Man Dwells …” (Heidegger, 2003). To dwell poetically 
means to exist in the span between earth and an unknown god who is concealed by the sky. Poetic 
life is necessarily anchored in the world but accepts a transcendental unknown as the basic measure 
of life. The poem notes further that one can live happily with the knowledge of the unknown as the 
measure for life under the condition of an attitude of kindness. Translated in English, Hölderlin 
states: “[…] As long as Kindness, / The Pure, still stays with his heart, man / Not unhappily 
measures himself / Against the Godhead […]” (Heidegger, 2003, p. 277).  Accepting the 
transcendental unknown as an essential measure for life requires kindness.  
 
Phenomenology has made important contributions to architectural theory with the aim of 
eliminating conceptual separations between minds, bodies, environments, and cultures. It has 
actively worked on dissolving the separation between body and mind, which was embedded, via 
Descartes, in the scientific method as radical doubt. It does so, however, by positing a 
transcendental and thus external ideal as a framework. This detachment from practice has had an 
effect. While the phenomenological discourse has in theory provided us with an idea of what 
meaningful architecture could be, so far there has been only a limited influence on the practice of 
architecture at large. Very few architects can be named whose designs explicitly reflect the 
phenomenological discourse. The Swiss architect Peter Zumthor, known for his concern for distinct 
atmospheres, is often named in this context. The urban reality experiences a different trend. More 
and more cities are designed and built by property developers, who are not necessarily interested in 
the poetics of building. This is in line with a general trend toward economic efficiency that sees 
value in short-term profit. The architectural profession supported this trend, although not always 
consciously. It contributed to the current malaise of a built environment, that does not resonate with 
people’s lives, when it shifted its attention from the sensuous to the scientific in the late 18th 
century, prioritizing ’objective’ values in architectural design (Pérez-Gómez, 1983; Vesely, 2004).  
How could meaningful change be effected? 
 
Like Heidegger’s philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s development of the phenomenological project 
constitutes an alternative to the Cartesian dualist view. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the ‘lived 
body’ was not only discussed in philosophy and architectural theory but also the cognitive sciences, 
initiating a dialogue that is well documented in the  academic literature, highlighting terms such 
as embodied cognition and situated cognition. Foundational in this context is the work of 
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Roche The Embodied Mind, published in a first 
edition in 1991 (Varela et al., 2016).1 Phenomenology has assisted the re-integration of the human 
body into conceptions of cognition (Dreyfus, 2008). 
 
Evan Thompson has expanded on the previous collaboration with Varela, incorporating also notions 
of intersubjectivity as developed by Edmund Husserl into a project that operates elegantly at the 
intersection of neuroscience and phenomenology (Thompson, 2007). Many others could be named. 
There has been a wealth of publications in recent years. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have 
likewise provided foundational work (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). The discourse has emphasized 
                                                
1 The second edition is a revised edition and has new introductions that consider critique related to the first edition’s 
interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology (Varela et al., 2016) (Dreyfus, 1993). 
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the centrality of life’s meaning in a world shared with others, but it has focused on analyzing rather 
than designing a meaningful world. Through its collaboration with the sciences, phenomenology has 
received considerably more attention than it would otherwise have and it has benefited from the 
trust that scientific results engender. 
 
Considering the above, it is consequent that architectural phenomenologists, such as Harry Francis 
Mallgrave, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, recently called for a more intensive 
collaboration with the cognitive sciences (Mallgrave et al., 2015) (Pérez-Gómez, 2016). It is hoped 
that this collaboration leads to a closer attachment of phenomenology to practice, and a rethinking 
of architectural practice on a larger scale. However, can we assume that science can provide for a 
bridge to a practice of designing?  
 
Founded in 2003 by the San Diego Chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), the 
Academy of Neuroscience and Architecture (ANFA) has fostered the collaboration between 
architectural practice and both the cognitive neurosciences and phenomenology. Neuroscientist Fred 
H. Gage, known for having discovered stem cells in the adult human brain in the 1990s, was invited 
to give the theme presentation at the 2003 AIA meeting. He presented scientific evidence that 
human beings are neurologically changed even in adult age by the environments they live in.  Until 
the discovery of stem cells in the adult human brain, one had assumed that neurogenesis, the genesis 
of authentic neurons, would only occur up to a certain point in the development of a living being 
and that the structure of the brain would then be fixed.  This understanding also supported the 
conceptualization of the human brain as a kind of computer and initiated numerous related research 
projects in Artificial Intelligence (Gage, 2003). The situation has changed. It seems now far less 
likely that one can model thinking machines (cp. Dreyfus, 1993).  The structure of the brain is not 
fixed, and besides, questions of cognition do not depend solely on the structure of the brain. Further 
research with mammals provided more evidence to which extent environments influence what we 
are. Gage’s paper states: 
 
By exposing experimental animals to enriched environments, or changing and modifying 
environments so they contain more stimulation, we can increase dramatically the total 
number of cells that exists, even within a short period of time. This increase in the division of 
cells persists in such a way that the animals that survive end up with as many as 50% more 
neurons that they would have had under other circumstances (Gage, 2003). 
 
There is something reassuring about scientific results that have been visualized via experiments. 
Knowledge is reassuring, wisdom less so. The scientific method operates within limits, but within 
these limits the rules are clear, engendering trust. Scientific evidence therefore creates a sense of 
urgency and relevance, even if the questions it addresses are not necessarily new. We still do not 
have any scientific evidence as to what constitutes an enriched or stimulating environment for us, 
human beings. What is stimulating for lab animals is not necessarily stimulating for human beings.  
 
In the text Ethics and Second-order Cybernetics Heinz von Foerster suggests that there are two 
kinds of human inhabitants, discoverers and inventors. The discoverers are those who look at the 
world from a scientific point of view. The inventors are those who consider the observer as part of 
the system they observe. Those who want to be discoverers, he suggests, “will most likely become 
astronomers, physicists and engineers.” Von Foerster further suggests biologists, poets and family 
therapists to be among the inventors. The two types of human inhabitants can live together without 
any problems, he further outlines, “as long as the discoverers discover inventors, and the inventors 
invent discoverers” (von Foerster, 2003, p.  294).  One can assume that it is this attitude that made 
cybernetics possible as an inter-disciplinary endeavor. The above mentioned call for a closer 
collaboration between the cognitive sciences and design is a reminder of the times when the second-
order version of cybernetics initiated a dialogue between the cognitive sciences and architectural 
design, notably via Gordon Pask and his students at the Architectural Association in London. 
Michael Arbib, a long time contributor to cybernetic literature, is among those who have been 
involved in the recent revival of the dialogue between the cognitive sciences and architecture 
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(Arbib, 2018). The integration of phenomenology into the conversation is promising, considering 
that phenomenology and second-order cybernetics share common roots. Both have developed from 
a scientific base and through a critical inquiry into the methodology of science. They both 
inquire into the paradox that science claims objectiveness on the basis of a methodology that relies 
on subjective observation. Both benefited from the philosophical investigations of Immanuel Kant 
into subjective observation and its relation to objective or universal truth. They both reject the idea 
that claims for objective truth can be made through a methodology to which an attitude is implicit 
that sees the world as a reality existing independent from acts of observation. Husserl calls this 
attitude the “natural attitude” (Husserl, 1954, p. 153). The natural attitude is implicit in all scientific 
inquiries. Nevertheless, Husserl’s aim was not to reject positive science. His aim was to 
complement the positive sciences by adding a “depth-dimension” (see Marbach 1982, p. 440). 
Terms, such as love, generosity, kindness, or empathy – depending on the author’s inclination – are 
inscribed in both projects and reflect in this context an openness in the approach to thinking, which 
goes beyond the framework that is described by the scientific method. And yet, there is a 
fundamental difference. When phenomenology asks “how perceptual experience of transcendent 
objects is possible” (Overgaard 2002, p. 213) the focus of second-order inquiry is on the question 
“how am I doing what I am doing” (Maturana 2012, p. 162). There is a shift from the transcendental 
to the worldly sphere in which we act.  
 
Heinz von Foerster pointed out that the freedom to decide only exists in the context of questions that 
are “in principle undecidable,” i.e., which are not “already decided by the choice of the framework in 
which they are asked” (von Foerster 2003, p. 293). Frameworks that are open in this radical sense, 
being “in principle undecidable,” are thus the only frameworks that allow people to make decisions. 
At the very end of Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics von Foerster provides a general guideline 
for making decisions: “Tell them they should always try to act so as to increase the number of choices. 
Yes, increase the number of choices!” (p. 295). Increasing the number of choices ensures that the 
framework remains a framework that is open for decisions.  
 
In the transition from first to second order, by the inclusion of the observer in the observations, 
cybernetics left the secure framework of the scientific method, which avoids through its method 
contradictions, ambiguities, and undecidability. In turn, however, cybernetics gained social 
relevance, by discussing questions not disconnected from living in the world and with others but 
from within living (see Chapman, 2019; 2019b). These questions are not to solve but to decide. This 
makes sense only when there is also the freedom to decide.  Under these circumstances, language 
and understanding are at the center of inquiry, and second-order inquiry becomes a framework that 
deals in the widest sense with questions of designing (see Glanville 2006). 
 
Reconsidering the issue of what stimulating environments could be, and considering as well the 
context of a framework that in its openness reflects freedom, the question to which extent 
universal communication under conditions of subjective freedom is possible, gains importance. 
Art has repeatedly and in radical ways opened the question on what language can be and 
accomplish, and how it is possible that different individuals with entirely different life 
experiences, even with different cultural backgrounds, recognize a work of art as art and their 
encounter with it as an aesthetic experience. Famously, Immanuel Kant dedicated one of the two 
parts of his Critique of Judgment to aesthetic judgment, addressing the problematics of 
universal communication under the condition of subjectivity (Kant, 1987). Kant’s solution, 
which is now well embedded in Western thought, bore the genius author by whose 
extraordinary sensibility the rules of nature are transferred into the work of art. While Kant 
does not assume that we can arrive at an ultimate objective description of the world, he 
suggests that we can ‘think’ the idea of nature in the encounter with it (p. 128).  According to 
Kant, it is because the work of art reflects the rules of nature that it is capable of universal 
communication. Questions of aesthetics have been of major importance subsequently to German 
idealism and phenomenology. Heidegger’s essay on the Origin of the Work of Art makes a 
prominent example (Heidegger, 2000). With Heidegger, the world acts in the work of art. The 
truth of the world speaks in the work of art through its openness. In second-order cybernetics 
and its relative radical constructivism, questions related to the potentiality of art and design, it 
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could be argued, are foundational, but they are approached from a pragmatic rather than from 
an ontological point of view. 
 
Dimensions of living 
It is generally well known that cybernetics evolved as a cross-disciplinary inquiry into goal-directed 
circular-causal processes with negative feedback (Heims, 1991, p.14-16). While the specifics of 
cybernetic history cannot be covered in this paper, it is important to note that from its very 
beginning the project of cybernetics made questions of language and understanding central to its 
inquiry. Margaret Mead’s presentation at the first annual symposium of the American Society for 
Cybernetics in 1967 provides an excellent account: 
 
I specifically want to consider the significance of the set of cross-disciplinary ideas 
which we first called “feedback” and then called “teleological mechanisms” and then 
called “cybernetics” – a form of cross-disciplinary thought which made it possible for 
members of many disciplines to communicate with each other easily in a language 
which all could understand. […] We thought we would go on to real interdisciplinary 
research, using this language as a medium.  (Mead, 1968, p. 2-3) 
 
Mead further suggested that the cybernetic ideas, which initiated the new society, should be applied 
to its structural organization. The paper was later published as Cybernetics of Cybernetics2 and is 
viewed as an important step in the development from first- to second-order cybernetics. Clarity in 
the definition of terms was essential, but for the discoverers to discover inventors, and the inventors 
to invent discoverers (cp. von Foerster, 2003, p. 294) a kind of radical openness granting freedom to 
others to make decisions was of key importance. The following passages trace the terms indicative 
of the openness of second-order cybernetics, making it a framework for the sharing of ideas. The 
term love, for example – alluded to at the beginning of this paper – is indeed part of cybernetic 
literature. 
 
The questions about what kind of environments we should want to live in have been lingering since 
at least the beginning of the 20th century, when the biologist Jakob von Uexküll highlighted that 
living beings cannot be conceptualized as disconnected from their concrete living environments 
(Umwelten3), that every being is made by and makes its Umwelt (Uexküll, 2014, 1926). Humberto 
Maturana’s Biology of Cognition (Maturana, 1980a) expanded on Uexküll’s model that carries 
notions of circular causality. Based on this, Maturana and Varela further expanded the understanding 
of living beings by conceptualizing them as autopoietic systems. In the introduction to the 
collection of the two essays that are constitutive for the conception of living systems as 
autopoietic and cognitive systems, Humberto Maturana emphasizes the phenomenon of love as 
an ethical principle, essential for the survival of human beings as social living systems 
(Maturana, 1980a)(Maturana and Varela, 1980). Love in this context is an ethical principle that 
is grounded in biology. 
 
Among human beings, the basic stabilizing factor in the constitution of a social system is the 
phenomenon of love, the seeing of the other as a partner in some or all the dimensions of 
living.  (Maturana, 1980b, p. xxvi) 
 
It is generally recognized by second-order cybernetics thinkers, that the notion of love 
explicates a basic human desire to connect. The term as such is, nevertheless, not frequently 
used in second-order literature, except when – and this is Maturana’s project – at the same time 
the task is undertaken to ground and redefine the term to liberate it from the many fuzzy 
                                                
2 The title was assigned to the paper by Heinz von Foerster who acted as the editor of the publication. 
3 Contemporary literature in the English language tends to use the German term Umwelt, in plural Umwelten, when 
speaking of Uexküllian concrete living environments to avoid confusion. Specifically, Umwelt should not be confused 
with the term lifeworld (Lebenswelt), which indicates a concept defined by Edmund Husserl. The two are distinctly 
different concepts. 
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meanings that popular usages assign to it. Associations to a supernaturalism, for example, that is 
in contradiction with second-order positions for its implicit support of a conceptual separation 
of bodies and minds (cp. Bateson and Bateson, 1988, p. 6-7) are generally avoided. It is 
important to keep in mind that cybernetics was developed in conversation with and for the 
dialogue between disciplines. The basis for such a dialogue is a frame of reference that meets 
consensus. 
 
In general, the discussion of meaning is excluded from research in the natural sciences (see also 
Brier, 2008, p. 230), and it is for this reason not surprising that Maturana’s comments exploring the 
ethical implications of his and Varela’s research are placed in the introduction of the collection. 
They were originally intended to become the appendix to the Autopoiesis text but were never 
published as such (Maturana, 1980b, p. xxiv). Maturana’s introduction can also be read as a 
commentary on the events that put an end in 1973 to Salvador Allende's government in Chile and its 
attempts to create bottom-up socialism, notably with the assistance of cybernetics researchers. 
Designed to foster the participation of workers in the management of the state’s economy, the 
computer network Project Cybersyn was developed from 1971 onwards with British cybernetician 
Stafford Beer as principal engineer.  It famously assisted the Allende government survive a strike 
organized by the opposition in October 1972 (Medina, 2011), but against the military coup in 
September of the next year, the government had no means. In 1980, when Maturana's comments 
were published, Augusto Pinochet had already governed Chile for seven years. "An absolute 
totalitarian society must negate love as an individual experience because love, sooner or later, leads 
to an ethical evaluation of the society that the loved one integrates,” writes Maturana (1980b, p. 
xxix). 
 
Notions of love remain for Maturana a subject of ethical concern and a point of entry to an 
inquiry. Developed in the mid-90s by Maturana in cooperation with psychologist Gerda Verden- 
Zöller, The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love, edited by Pille Bunnell (Maturana and 
Verden-Zöller, 2008), proposes an evolutionary history of the human lineage that is radically 
different from the version that argues for understanding humanness as guided by aggression 
and competition – a point over-emphasized by Darwinism. The Origin of Humanness proposes 
that the human lineage has evolved with its specific characteristics and with language as a 
medium for conversation only because of the conservation of habits and preferences that focus 
on care and love, and precisely not on competition and aggression. While the work has 
numerous philosophical implications, it is not per se a philosophical work. It is the work of 
scientists, and it is, interestingly, because it is the work of scientists and because the text relies 
on scientific reasoning that the text succeeds in grounding the term love and in returning it to us 
as an ethical principle. Maturana and Verden-Zöller firmly embed notions of love in the biology 
of human beings, and by doing so liberate it of the associations to superficial popular usages on 
the one hand and supernaturalism on the other. It is an astonishing work. The text performs a 
fundamental liberation of the term love as if it was a work of art, and yet it appears to be of key 
importance that the text situates itself within science. In science, through the scientific method, 
what is recognized as truth is questioned, exposed to doubt, to be re-questioned, validated or 
dismissed. By its method, science performs and re-performs to create a consensual frame of 
reference. It is difficult to imagine how this act of liberation could have been initiated except 
through the form of scientific discourse that we, readers, commonly accept as a valid frame of 
reference. The text emerges as a reminder of the fundamental aim of science to perform acts of 
liberation.  
 
It is, however, the specific strength of second-order approaches, in contrast to first-order 
approaches, that they avoid prediction in favor of an openness that allows others to act. 
Consequently, the book concludes that we, human beings, have the capacity to design our 
world and by doing so also to define what we want it and us to be. The text is a prime example 
of second-order reasoning both in form and content as it returns agency to the participants in 
the conversation, in this case, the readers of the book. 
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Second-order cybernetic literature has integrated the notion of love as an ethical principle via other 
terms that carry its meaning or part of it, firmly embedding in its framework notions that relate to a 
willingness to give without expectations for receiving something in return. The notion of love is 
tacitly present in the term generosity that is frequently used by Ranulph Glanville  (cp. Brier et al., 
2015). According to Glanville, the term generosity was considered by Gordon Pask and his co-
researchers the basic criterion for judging whether a cybernetic system is successful. The criterion 
for judgment was whether the system “aids people without taking away from them” (Glanville, 
1988, p. 219). Stripped of allusions to passion, the term generosity goes beyond tolerance and 
embeds love as an ethical principle in second-order thought. Generosity avoids the evocation of the 
opposite hate – one could say that it sits between poles – and is well designed to accommodate the 
principle idea of a meta-language as a frame of reference. 
 
Conversations, or the Germs of Novel Experiences  
The work of Gordon Pask is of particular importance within the context of design and art. Having 
obtained a PhD in psychology, Pask was interested in frameworks for learning and engaged from 
the early 1950s onwards in the making of machines through which people's learning – in the widest 
sense – could be facilitated (Husbands et al., 2008). Pask's ideas of learning are based on the 
understanding that human beings are learning beings, i.e., they strive to learn. New knowledge and 
skills increase the chances of survival in the living world. Through learning, living beings stabilize 
themselves. They re-organize vis-à-vis an environment that cannot be fully known, which presents 
them with novel challenges. According to Pask, human beings seek situations, which provide the 
potential of novel experiences, and learn to master them (Pask, 1970, p. 76). Pask’s approach is in 
line with certain positions in pragmatism. Theories of learning, as, for example, formulated by John 
Dewey (Dewey, 2007), resonate in Pask’s conception of the human as a learning being. Also with 
Dewey, a basic consideration concerns the role of education as enabling. It should not be knowledge 
per se but rather the engendering of the potential for future action that education should be 
concerned with. Dewey emphasizes the independence of the person who learns. The focus of all 
Deweyan theories of education lies in an initiation of a capacity to construct strategies to learn. 
Considering the approaches to learning of both Pask and Dewey, one will realize that both see in 
aesthetic experiences the highest potential for learning (Dewey, 2005; Pask, 1970). Both also 
confirm a basic position of Kant’s aesthetics, where art is considered to have the effect of advancing 
“the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social communication” (Kant 1987, p. 173). Art 
provides the highest potential for creating experiences that keep the process of self-organization 
alive.  
Nevertheless, Dewey, in his work Art as Experience, questions whether past masterpieces shown in 
museums, detached from the life-context in which they were created, could still be considered 
objects with high potential for aesthetic experience. He argues that detaching works of art from the 
context in which they were created runs counter to the idea of art. In doing so, he questions Western 
aesthetics in general and its tradition (Dewey, 2005, p. 6-9). Kant, in contrast, follows Western 
traditions. As in Plato’s conception of the muse inspired artist, he anchors the origin of the work of 
art via the character of the genius in knowledge that is essentially divine (see Westermann 2019). 
Conversely, Dewey anchors art in the place of its creation, i.e., in life. According to Dewey, 
aesthetic experiences emerge from everyday experiences, and in the tension of life, which oscillates 
between loss and recovery of union with an environment (Dewey, 2005, p. 15). An aesthetic 
experience is referred to also and synonymously as an experience, whereby experience can slide 
into being an experience. According to Dewey, aesthetic experiences “punctuate the stream of 
living” (Dewey, 2005, p. 7). 
 
Because experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a 
world of things, it is art in germ.  Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of 
that delightful perception which is esthetic experience. (Dewey, 2005, p. 19) 
 
What is an aesthetic experience?  An aesthetic experience, according to Dewey, generates a sense of 
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fulfillment that sets it off from the stream of everyday experiences, of closure and 
consummation but without cessation.  “This closure of a circuit of energy is the opposite of arrest, 
of stasis” (Dewey, 2005, p.  41).  Gordon Pask follows a similar path when he suggests that human 
beings seek for novel experiences, and thus for situations that are “aesthetically potent” (Pask, 
1970).  According to Pask, novelty emerges from the ordinary. It is anchored in life. While, with 
Dewey, aesthetic experience emerges from common general experience, in Pask’s theory the point 
of departure is circumscribed more precisely and anchored in the intersubjective space. Pask defines 
conversation as the basic unit of human social life. Conversation engenders the potential for the 
development of novel experiences. It is thus the basic unit of art. By reducing Dewey’s general term 
experience to the more specific conversation, Pask initiates a displacement that re-emphasizes the 
capacity of art to foster social communication. 
 
The word “conversation” is given an interpretation, which refines its common sense 
meaning. Conversation maintains the autonomy or identity of systems and, also, generates 
independencies between systems (human, societal, or others), which is a prerequisite of 
dialogue.  (Pask, 1980, p. 1) 
 
According to Pask, for self-organizing beings who strive to learn, the most basic and defining 
experience is conversation. The term embeds human beings in a social system. Conversation is the 
condition for dialogue and thus understanding (cp. Pask, 1975). A conversation is what “leads to 
the exchange of concepts” between participants (Pask, 1996). 
 
Ranulph Glanville’s work, dedicated to a second-order theory of designing, builds on Pask’s 
research mentioned above. His Ph.D. thesis Theory of Objects from 1975 describes through formal 
language the conditions for entry into what Glanville calls the “universe of observation” (Glanville, 
1975, 2013), and which frames all processes of design. The thesis marks the crossing to a second-
order interpretation of the activity of designing as in conversation, which Glanville explored in 
depth in his later publications. A design task is a “wicked” task. It cannot be fully described. Instead 
the task emerges in the design process itself. Designing is thus never about finding the solution 
(Cross, 2007; Glanville, 2007; Sweeting 2018). A design task can be addressed in a multitude of 
ways. It is a classical case of a question that is – as von Foerster put it – “in principle undecidable.” 
For this reason, the act of sketching, a basic design activity, also appears to have no immediate 
purpose. It is playful. Designing is a conversation that a designer holds with her- or himself, as well 
as with others. It is, as Pask states, a search for what is aesthetically potent. Glanville calls it 
“magic.” Whether it is the ultimate magic, can never been known, but it can be decided whether it is 
“good enough” (Glanville, 2006, p. 105). Glanville had a lifelong interest in the relation of ethics 
and design (see Sweeting, 2018). In the paper Try again. Fail again. Fail better: the cybernetics in 
design and the design in cybernetics Glanville specifically highlights that cybernetics and design 
“imply the same ethical principles” (2007, p. 1173). Design requires generosity, an openness of the 
mind. Without this, there can be no listening and thus no conversation. 
 
In conversation, a space for the future and intersubjectivity emerges. Second-order cybernetics is 
projective - unlike science, which is predictive - and radically open to allow for the agency of 
others. It is in this openness that ethical principles are realized. Carrying the ‘germ’ of aesthetic 





The paper outlined how architectural theory with the support from phenomenology has attempted to 
frame the world we live in with others with a specific focus on questions of meaning. It then 
proceeded to explore how second-order cybernetics provides for a different and more grounded 
approach to the question, initiating a shift from the transcendental to the worldly sphere in which we 
act. The paper discussed the principles of a second-order cybernetics approach to a framing of the 
world(s) in which we live with others. It compared them to key concepts in phenomenology as well 
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as selected theories in Dewey’s pragmatism and Kant’s transcendental idealism. By reducing 
Dewey’s general term experience to the more specific conversation, Pask initiates, the paper argued, 
a displacement that re-emphasizes the capacity of art to foster social communication. Conversation 
engenders the potential for the development of novel experiences and can be considered the basic 
unit of art. 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that second-order cybernetics conceptualizes a framework that is 
radically open for the agency of others in an unknown future. It rejects detachment and 
transcendence toward absolutes – which would constitute a fixation. Instead it situates itself within 
the intersubjective space of conversation. Second-order cybernetics has grounded the concept of 
love in the biology of living and incorporated it as ethical principle in an aesthetics that makes a 
meta-framework. It assists us in maintaining a critical view of the processes involved in creating 
understandings of the world and in designing for those who live in a world with others. The paper 
has identified as ethical principle implicit in second-order cybernetics an aesthetics that is grounded 
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